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Deceit and facial expression in
children: the enabling role of the
“poker face” child and the dependent
personality of the detector
Marien Gadea*, Marta Aliño, Raúl Espert and Alicia Salvador
Department of Psychobiology, Faculty of Psychology, University of València, València, Spain
This study presents the relation between the facial expression of a group of children
when they told a lie and the accuracy in detecting the lie by a sample of adults.
To evaluate the intensity and type of emotional content of the children’s faces, we
applied an automated method capable of analyzing the facial information from the
video recordings (FaceReader 5.0 software). The program classified videos as showing
a neutral facial expression or an emotional one. There was a significant higher mean
of hits for the emotional than for the neutral videos, and a significant negative
correlation between the intensity of the neutral expression and the number of hits
from the detectors. The lies expressed with emotional facial expression were more
easily recognized by adults than the lies expressed with a “poker face”; thus, the less
expressive the child the harder it was to guess. The accuracy of the lie detectors
was then correlated with their subclinical traits of personality disorders, to find that
participants scoring higher in the dependent personality were significantly better lie
detectors. A non-significant tendency for women to discriminate better was also found,
whereas men tended to be more suspicious than women when judging the children’s
veracity. This study is the first to automatically decode the facial information of the
lying child and relate these results with personality characteristics of the lie detectors
in the context of deceptive behavior research. Implications for forensic psychology were
suggested: to explore whether the induction of an emotion in a child during an interview
could be useful to evaluate the testimony during legal trials.
Keywords: deceit, children, facial expression, emotion, dependent personality, gender differences
Introduction
The present study ﬁts in the general background of the need to identify valid indicators of
deceptive behavior and/or ﬁnd measures that validly discriminate between liars and truth-tellers.
For a long time, this question has stimulated interdisciplinary research despite criticism and
skepticism due to the general lack of valid and reliable results as well as discussions around
the utility of the laboratory-designs used to explore deception (Vrij and Granhag, 2012). One
important claim in this ﬁeld is to examine deception in quite naturalistic settings, with the aim
to provide relatively unrestricted “honest vs. deceptive” statements and so improve ecological
validity (Gamer and Ambach, 2014). A comprehensive deﬁnition of deception is that “succesful
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or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create
in another person a belief which the communicator considers
to be untrue” (Vrij, 2000, p. 15). Thus, the deceptive behavior
is an interpersonal exchange of information: a very special one
where there is a liar and a deceived person, or lie detector.
In this kind of social communication, adult subjects achieve,
overall, an accuracy rate of around 54% of all statements
judged -independently whether they are truth or lie – only
slightly above chance (see the meta-analysis of nearly 24,500
veracity judgements by Bond and DePaulo, 2006). The ability
to diﬀerentiate between children’s true and false statements is
also an important issue on this ﬁeld because children can be
victims or witnesses to crimes and may be required to testify
about their experiences in court (Brunet et al., 2013; see also
the review of Lee, 2013). The studies show that when adults
attempt to diﬀerentiate children’s deceptive behavior, including
parents, child protection lawyers, police and social workers, and
judges, are highly inaccurate and rarely perform above chance
levels (Crossman and Lewis, 2006; Eldestein et al., 2006). This fact
has been partially explained by some authors by referring to the
observed behavior of children when they lie, closely mimicked
from subjects who are telling the truth (e.g., to make direct eye
contact, Talwar and Lee, 2002).
Until present, no demographic individual diﬀerence (i.g.,
gender, education, age, experience) has shown to be reliably
related to deception detection’s accuracy (Aamodt and Custer,
2006). It has been shown recently that people ﬁnd limitations
in lie detection mainly due to weakness in behavioral cues of
deception (Hartwig and Bond, 2011). So the eﬀort of researchers
to improve lie detection should focus on increasing behavioral
diﬀerences between the liars and the truth tellers. With some
exceptions, few studies have focused on the liar to determine
individual diﬀerences in the ability to lie and some authors
have claimed the necessity to study the liar more in deep to
fully understand the deceptive behavior (Wright et al., 2013),
for instance, Wright et al. (2012) showed that the best lie
detectors are also the best liars. Moreover, there are some
physical characteristics and observed behaviors which have been
associated to the liar, under the assumption that some hidden
mental states associated to the act of lying could inﬂuence
behavior and, therefore, the lie could be inferred (Hill and Craig,
2002). In this sense, certain parameters of the speech (Spence
et al., 2012) or a number of kinetic variables (Duran et al.,
2013) have been proven to be capable of diﬀerentiating between
liars and truth tellers. One of the most studied parameters is
the facial expression of the liar, given that the human face
provides a number of signals which are essential for interpersonal
communication in our social life. The face has been considered
the place for the most expressive behavior and a window to the
subject’s mental states, where people possibly cannot overcome
the constraints of the translation of their intentions into their
expressions (DePaulo, 1992). It has been recently shown through
automated tools that when deceptive behavior spontaneously
appears, continuous ﬂuctuations of movement in the upper
face are characterized by dynamical properties of less stability
and greater complexity, despite no apparent diﬀerences in the
overall amount of movement between deception and truth
(Duran et al., 2013). The face is thought to be susceptible of
a “leakage” of hidden negative emotional states (supposedly
associated to deceptive behavior) that shows facial micro-
expressions lasting only tenths of a second, which some authors
claim to be a clue of deception (Ekman and Friesen, 2003).
This could be especially clear when taking into account the
type of lie, for instance, Warren et al. (2009) showed that
the detectors were signiﬁcantly above chance for emotional
compared with unemotional lies ones, and they reported the
beneﬁt of subtle facial expressions of the liars as the key
for the task. Thus, one can assume that the facial expression
of the speaker when expressing emotions is a determinant
factor for the possibility of detecting his/her deceptive behavior.
Then one could wonder if every individual person perceives
those emotional cues of the face equally, and if the answer
is “no” (as is plausible) then maybe exists a detector whose
perception is more adequate to detect lies. In fact, despite of
the very poor average performance in lie detection, there are
some persons that seem to be especially good at this task,
as showed by Ekman et al. (1999), who found accuracy rates
from 68 to 73% amongst groups with a special interest in
deception detection (unfortunately, they did not measure the
individual diﬀerences in emotional perception of the detectors).
Of more interest is the ﬁnding of Ein-Dor and Perry (2014)
regarding the attachment anxiety, but not other types of anxiety,
predicted more accurate detection of deceitful statements. It is
reasonable to think that subjects with attachment anxiety do
not perceive the emotional information expressed by others in
the same manner than the healthy persons. Moreover, we can
expand the search a bit far from explicitly clinical disorders
to subclinical traits. In the interesting work of Nettle (2006)
regarding personality variations, the author argues the possible
adaptive function of certain personality characteristics often
viewed as undesirable, for instance, the beneﬁts of neuroticism
would be vigilance to dangers, striving and competitiveness (in
front of its costs of stress, anxiety disorder, and depression).
Other authors suggested that clinical levels of paranoia may
represent the inevitable cost of eﬃcient threat perception–
or ‘justiﬁed’ suspicion – that is necessary for survival of the
human species (Green and Phillips, 2004). So, the exploration
of subclinical levels of these personality traits in the normal
population in relation with lie detection could be interesting as
well.
Given the above scenario, our main aim was to investigate
the relation between the facial expressions of a group of children
when they told a lie and the chance of detecting the lie by a
sample of adult detectors. To evaluate the intensity and type
of emotional content of the children’s faces, we applied an
automated method capable of analyzing the facial information
from the video recordings, the FaceReader 5.0 software. This is a
tool whose neural network has been trained using a high-quality
set of approximately 10,000 facial images, manually described
as emotional or not by human coders, achieving a classiﬁcation
accuracy of 89% by itself (den Uyl and van Kuilenburg, 2005;
Terzis et al., 2010). We expected that the information obtained
from the FaceReader regarding the emotionality expressed in
the children’s face would be positively related to the success
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in the lie detection task. A second aim was to test the
possibility that the anxious or the paranoid personality disorder
measured at a subclinical level in the sample of detectors
could be related to a more accurate detection of interpersonal
deceit.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
The Liars: Children Performing the Videotapes
A total of four Caucasian Spanish-speaking female students of
7 years-old were selected from a local school after obtaining
informed consent from their parents. We asked for children in
a classroom of a primary school which we had access through
one of the teachers and with the permission of the headteacher.
We got favorable feedback from the parents of only ﬁve children:
the four girls plus one boy that we didn’t include in the sample
in order to be homogeneous about the gender variable. This
age was selected because the ability of lying, in the sense of
applying an intentional component in the discourse to deceit,
is supposedly reached. Theories of development regarding the
ability of lying suggest it increases from 2 to 3 years to reach
its pick at 6 years, in parallel to the development of Theory of
Mind and executive functioning in children (Talwar and Lee,
2008; Evans and Lee, 2013; Cheung et al., 2015). The participants
had no reported history of psychiatric disorders, medical illness
or chronic pharmacological treatment, and their intellectual
abilities were normative and homogenous according to their
teacher.
The Detectors: Sample of Adults Who Watched the
Videotapes
A total of 104 young adults, undergraduate volunteers between
18 and 26 years-old, 29 men with a mean age of 20.03 years
(SD 4.07) and 75 women with a mean age of 19.91 years
(SD 4.48), were selected from the University community
to take part in the experiment, without monetary reward.
Participants were excluded if they reported current or past
psychiatric/neurologic illness, use of psychotropic medication or
chronic pharmacological treatment.
All subjects were treated in accordance with “Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct”1. All
procedures were in accordance with the standards of our
institutional committee of ethics in research with humans that
approves the experiments, and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration
and its later amendments.
Materials
Recording of the Videos: the Deceit Detection Test
The Deceit Detection Test consisted in 12 video-recordings that
expressed true or false statements from the group of female
children cited above. This material was elaborated as follows.
The videos were ﬁlmed with a Sony Handycam HDR-PJ200E
in a well illuminated room of our laboratory. Special care was
1http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/principles.pdf
taken to ensure good frontal light on the participant’s face, which
is an important requirement for the FaceReader 5.0 software to
produce reliable results. Also important is that participants are
looking directly toward the camera while showing their facial
expression. Although the software can handle rotations up to 40◦,
minimal rotation is desired to ensure optimal quality readings.
The recordings with a resolution of 320 × 240 at 12 frames
per second were saved as AVI ﬁles to be analyzed later with
FaceReader 5.0 software. The videotapes were conducted by two
researchers who were unaware of the aim of the experiment.
Once the context of the recording was set, one of the researchers
instructed the children about the task. The children were told
they must tell a story, freely chosen by them. The story must be
about what happened at a particular moment in time, and must
be false or true. So, they were asked to tell the truth or elaborate
a spontaneous lie about what happened in a concrete temporal
moment of their life (past, present, future). Meanwhile, the other
researcher took the record with the camera (six videos for each
child, being three with false content and three with true). The
children were pressed a bit to do so (and to do it right). This was
achieved when one researcher (a stranger man for them) with a
camera in hand pointing to her face told them that the acting
was “very important for their parents and they must perform
the show correctly.” The reader can consult concretely the given
instructions and a transcription to English of the valid recordings
in the Supplementary Material section. It has been argued that to
give ﬁxed instructions about when to lie (and when not to) means
that the experimental study lacks of ecological validity (Sweeney
and Ceci, 2014), but our aim was that the situation resembled a
demand to the children to follow instructions from the authority
(obey to the parent in the occurrence of a legal trial for instance)
given the data pointing that children are very able to fabricate
false reports to gain some advantage or to satisfy authority (Bala
et al., 2005). These procedures resulted in 24 naturalistic and
spontaneously performed videos with a maximum duration of
about 1 min each. A pre-selection of the videos was carried
out before implemented the experiment: note that the children
were free to tell what they want, and some of their statements
were inadequate (the instruction was to give a plausible lie, so
statements like “I go to the moon this afternoon” were considered
invalid) and other were too short or not easily understood. Thus,
an individual and separated evaluation of them was additionally
performed by three clinical judges with the aim of selecting the
best videos in terms of general credibility, veracity and realism,
speech quality and similar duration (length). This resulted in 14
videos (seven genuine, seven deceptive) that lasted an average
of 32 s with a minimum of 12 s and a maximum of 64 s (SD:
15.7). The minimum number of videos for a given child was
two and the maximum, ﬁve. These videos were submitted to the
FaceReader analysis but unfortunately two of them could not be
evaluated by the software due to technical reasons, so the ﬁnal
data analysis was performed on 12 videos (six truths and six lies,
minimum number of videos from the same child one, maximum
four) that were included in the test. These videos were presented
in a computer to the sample of detectors, sequentially and in
semi counterbalanced order. After each video a gray screen with
genuine or deceptive options was shown (“was the girl telling a lie
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or telling a truth?”) so the detector could complete a direct, self-
report judgment. The scoring of the videos is explained in next
sections.
Automated Analysis of Facial Expression:
FaceReader 5.0
Facial expressions were analyzed using FaceReader software
version 5.0 (Noldus Information Technology B. V., 2012), a
commercially available program that uses algorithms to evaluate
and classify, on frame-by-frame basis, facial images and videos
into the following categories of basic emotions: happiness,
sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust, and neutral (Ekman, 1970).
FaceReader works in three steps: (1) face ﬁnding, (2) face
modeling, and (3) face classiﬁcation. This tool ﬁnds a face
using the Active Template Method. Then it creates a virtual,
super-imposed 3D Active Appearance Model featuring almost
500 unique marks of the face. In a third stage, scores for the
intensity and probability of facial expressions for basic emotions
are computed. These variables reﬂect a measure of the magnitude
of that emotion being shown from 0% (not at all) to 100% (perfect
match). In our study, this facial analysis software analyzed more
than 370 s of video recording, i.e., around 5,685 frames on six
basic emotion scales. In FaceReader you can choose from a list
of four models to ﬁt (general, children, east-asian, and elderly) so
the appropriate model was selected (Caucasian children between
3 and 10 years). Additionally, a variable that FaceReader takes
into account consists in the characteristic facial expression that
some people have by nature (sad, angry, etc.). You can calibrate
FaceReader to correct for these person’s speciﬁc biases toward a
certain facial expression so that a real emotion can be analyzed.
To do so, the user must use one or more videos as calibration
material, as it was done in the current study. In the current
research, at least two videos of each person were chosen for the
calibration process, and a higher sample rate was implemented,
because our video’s length did not exceed the minute. This was to
make sure that the calibration material contained a diverse set of
images.
After the analysis we classiﬁed each video in just two
categories: “neutral” or “emotional.” The “neutral” videos were
those whose percentage without emotional expression (neutral)
was between 70 and 94%. The emotional videos were when the
sum of all the expressed emotions was higher than the percent of
neutral expression (thus note that emotional videos could include
some more “happy” and other more “sad”). This classiﬁcation
resulted in six emotional videos and six neutral videos, being half
of them a lie and half of them a truth, respectively.
Personality Disorders Screening Test: Salamanca
Questionnaire
Recently published by Pérez Urdániz et al. (2011) as a screening
tool to evaluate 11 personality disorders, some of them according
to The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) version IV-TR (paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal, histrionic,
antisocial, narcissist, and dependent) and some other according
to the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD) version
10 (emotionally unstable personality disorder-impulsive type,
emotionally unstable personality disorder-borderline type, also
known as limit, anankastic, and anxious.). Additionally, the
11 traits are categorized in three diﬀerent groups: Type A:
strange and extravagants (paranoid, schizoid, and schizotype),
Type B: immature (histrionic, antisocial, narcissist, and both
subtypes of emotional unstable disorders: impulsive and limit),
and Type C: avoiding (anankastic, dependent, and anxious). The
questionnaire consists in a total of 22 questions and each trait
of personality is evaluated trough two questions with a 4-point
Likert scale (false = 0 points; sometimes true = 1 point; usually
true = 2 points; always true = 3 points). The cutoﬀ score is
established at three points for every trait. This questionnaire has
been validated and correlated with the Interpersonal Personality
Disorder Examination, being considered an adequate test of
screening, with a sensitivity of 100% and a speciﬁcity of 76.3%
(Caldero-Alonso, 2009). It is a self-assessment questionnaire
(<10 min) with an easy interpretation.
Dependent Variables and Statistical Analysis
Regarding the Deceit Detection Test, seven raw dependent
variables were considered for the analyses: (1). Total Hits, is the
total score when the detectors guess the child’s statement (both
the true and false) with a maximum of 12. (2). False Positives,
when the detectors thought that a statement was genuine but
it was deceptive (the detector believed in the girl but she was
lying) with a maximum of six. (3). False Negatives, the total
score when detectors thought the statement was deceptive but
it was not (the detector did not believe in the girl but she was
telling the truth) with a maximum of six. (4). Deception-Hits:
we considered separately the scores of the detectors regarding
the false statements, with a maximum of six, and the (5) Truth-
Hits: the scores of the detectors regarding the true statements,
with a maximum of six. It was also considered what was guessed
according to the FaceReader analysis: (6) Emotional-Hits (with
a maximum of six) for the guessed about videos with emotional
content; and (7) Neutral-Hits (with a maximum of six) regarding
the videos without emotional content.
We used also signal-detection analysis for hypothesis
testing (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999), by calculating the
discriminability (d’) index and the participantbias criterion (C)
index, regarding their ability to detect the lies. The interpretation
of (d’) is that the larger the index the better the discriminability,
where values near 0 indicate random performance. When the (C)
index is 0, this indicates no bias in the judge. Being the signal
a lie, a negative (C) index indicates a truth-bias and a positive
one indicates a lie-bias. On the other hand, The Salamanca
Questionnaire gave 14 scores: Three main scores (for the main
Type A, B, and C scales) and 11 subscores for each of the
personality disorders described above.
All raw scores were mostly analyzed with non-parametric
statistics due to the nature of the variables (Kolmogorov–
Smirnov Test <0.05 in most cases). Thus, diﬀerences between
related variables were tested with the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Test,
gender diﬀerences were tested with the U Mann–Whitney test,
and associations between variables were tested with a series of
Spearman Rank correlations. All analyses were run with SPSS 19.
Data are presented in means, SD, conﬁdence intervals, and index
d Cohen for eﬀect size when corresponding.
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Results
The Table 1 shows a descriptive of the 12 videos recorded, with
percent of each emotion, total sum of emotions and neutral
expressions according the FaceReader analysis, as well as the
classiﬁcation of each video in Neutral or Emotional (N vs.
E) and in True or False content (T vs. F), and the Total
Hits (raw score and percent) observed for each video. There
was a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the intensity of
the neutral expression (% Neutral/FaceReader) and number
of hits from the sample (ρ = −0.70; p < 0.01). The videos
were then classiﬁed in a 2 × 2 Table, according the T/F and
E/N variables, to form four boxes (three videos in each). The
mean percent of Hits for the three Emotional-True videos
was 77.2%, and for the Emotional-False videos was 84.9% The
mean percent of Hits for the three Neutral-True videos was
56.7% and for the Neutral-False was 46.4%. Thus, the percent-
diﬀerence of correct classiﬁcation for the true videos depending
on emotional expression was 20.5%. For the false videos -
depending on emotional expression as well- was 38.4%. This
diﬀerence was tested with a Chi-square test but it was not
signiﬁcant [χ2 (gl 1) = 1.42; n.s.].
TheTables 2 and 3 show the means and SD for the sample (as a
whole and separated into women and men) regarding the Deceit
Detection Test, including the indexes of discriminability (d′) and
the participant bias criterion (C), as well as the scores from the
Salamanca Questionnaire as explained above (3 main scales and
11 subscales). The mean of Total Hits for the whole sample of
videos (regardless of the content of the video) was 7.98 (SD: 1.4),
so the classiﬁcation was correct in a 66.5% of the recordings
(which was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from a constant of 50% chance:
t(gl 103) = 14, p < 0.001). The diﬀerence between scores for
False Positives (mean = 2.05; SD = 0.9) and False Negatives
(mean = 1.96; SD = 1) was not signiﬁcant, as neither was the
diﬀerence between scores for Truth Hits (mean= 4.02; SD= 1.0)
and Deception Hits (mean = 3.96; SD = 0.9). Interestingly,
the diﬀerence between scores for Emotional Hits (mean = 4.88;
SD = 0.9) and Neutral Hits (mean = 3.11; SD = 1.1) was
signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon Z = −7.7; p< 0.001; CI 95% for the mean
Emotional-Hits (4.69–5.05) versus Neutral-Hits (2.88–3.32), d
Cohen = 1.7).
The pattern of signiﬁcant correlations between the Deceit
Detection Test and the Salamanca questionnaire showed a
signiﬁcant correlation between the Type C scale and the Neutral
Hits score (ρ = 0.21, p < 0.02). The Dependent subscale (part
of the Type C scale) was the most strongly related to the Deceit
Detection Test, with signiﬁcant direct correlations with the Hits
score (Rho = 0.25, p < 0.008), with the Deception Hits score
(ρ = 0.26, p < 0.007), and with the Neutral Hits score (ρ = 0.27,
p < 0.003), as well as a negative correlation with the False
positives score (ρ = −0.25, p< 0.009).
Despite the low number of men in the sample, we checked
gender diﬀerences (see Tables 2 and 3) and observed a number of
tendencies that approached signiﬁcance in the Deceit Detection
Test, especially the higher mean for Truth Hits in women
(Mann–Whitney U = 858, p = 0.08) and the higher mean for
Neutral Hits in women (Mann–Whitney U = 859, p = 0.08),
as well as the higher mean for False Negatives in men (Mann–
Whitney U = 853, p = 0.07). The diﬀerences for the Salamanca
Questionnaire were more salient: men showed a signiﬁcantly
higher score in the Type A scale [strange and extravagant;Mann–
Whitney U = 605, p < 0.001; CI 95% mean for men (3.8–5.2)
vs. women (2.4–3.3), d Cohen = 0.8] as well as in each of its
subscales: paranoid (Mann–Whitney U = 770, p < 0.01; CI 95%
mean for men (1.3–2) versus women (0.9–1.3), d Cohen = 0.46),
schizoid (Mann–Whitney U = 795, p < 0.02: CI 95% mean
for men (1.4–2.4) versus women (1–1.6), d Cohen = 0.49),
and schizotype [Mann–Whitney U = 769, p < 0.008; CI 95%
mean for men (0.5–1.2) vs. women (0.3–0.7), d Cohen = 0.35].
Men also showed a signiﬁcantly higher score in two subscales
from the Type B scale (immature): antisocial [Mann–Whitney
U = 873, p < 0.03; CI 95% mean for men (0.2–0.6) vs. women
(0.1–0.3), d Cohen = 0.34] and narcissist [Mann–Whitney
U = 815, p < 0.03; CI 95% mean for men (0.7–1.6) vs. women
TABLE 1 | General characterization of the videos: “Video/Girl” refers to number of the video and first initial of the name of each girl who was recorded.
VIDEO/GIRL Happy Sad Surprised Fear Other % Emo % Neu E/N T/F Total hits % Hits
1 (A) 67.5% 6.3% – – 1.2% 75% 25% E F 85 81.7
2 (S) 53.5% – 9% – 0.3% 62.5% 37.2% E F 88 84.6
3 (A) 20.4% – – – 1.4% 21.8% 78.2% N F 14 13.4
4 (F) – – 29% – – 29% 70% N V 54 51.9
5 (F) – – 20.9% – 1.7% 22.6% 77.4% N F 83 79.8
6 (S) – – 5.9% – 1.6% 7.5% 92.5% N V 75 72.1
7 (S) – – 55.2% – 1.6% 56.8% 43.2% E F 92 88.4
8 (F) – – 53.9% – 4.1% 58% 42% E V 86 82.6
9 (S) 6.1 – 22% – 0.7% 28.8% 71.2% N F 48 46.1
10 (F) 47.1% 10.6% 15.7% 7.9% 0.2% 81.5% 18.5% E V 84 80.7
11 (L) 43.5% – – 8.2% 4.3% 55.9% 44% E V 71 68.2
12 (A) – – – – 5.8 5.8% 94.2% N V 48 46.1
“Happy. . .Other” refer to observed percent of that emotion in the video from the FaceReader analysis.” % Emo” and “% Neu” refer to the observed total percent of
expressed emotions and neutral expression from the FaceReader analysis. “E/N” refers to the classification of the videos into Emotional or Neutral. “T/F” refers to the
classification of the videos into True or False content. Total Hits refers to the number of subjects (from the total n = 104) who guessed the content of each particular video,
transformed into percent in the last column % Hits.
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TABLE 2 | Means (Standard Differences) are shown for the Total sample (T) and separately for men (M) and women (W) for the scores of the Deceit
Detection Test, including statistical trends for the gender variable.
TH FP FN TH DH EH NH d′ C
T(104) 7.98 (1.4) 2.05 (0.9) 1.96 (1) 4.02 (1) 3.96 (0.9) 4.88 (0.9) 3.11 (1.1) 0.33(.24) 0.16 (.28)
M(29) 7.72 (1.4) 2 (0.9) 2.28 (0.9) 3.72 (0.9) 4 (0.9) 4.93 (0.9) 2.79 (1) 0.28 (.23) 0.23 (.26)
W(75) 8.08 (1.4) 2.07 (0.8) 1.84 (1) 4.13 (1) 3.95 (0.8) 4.85 (0.9) 3.23 (1) 0.35 (0.24) 0.13 (0.28)
U-Mann–Whitney n.s. n.s. 0.7 0.08 n.s. n.s. 0.08 n.s. n.s.
TH, Total Hits, independent if the video performed a truth or a lie. FP, false positives (subject believed but the girl was lying), FN, false negatives (subject didn’t believe but
the girl was telling the truth), TH, Truth Hits score: hits for true statements, HD, Deception Hits score: hits for false statements, EH, Emotional Hits: hits for videos with
high emotional facial expression, HN, Neutral Hits: hits for videos with neutral facial expression, d’, index of discriminability, C, participant bias criterion index.
TABLE 3 | Means (Standard Differences) are shown for the Total sample (T) and separately for men (M) and women (W) for the scores of the Salamanca
Personality Disorders Test, including statistical differences for the gender variable.
SA SB SC P SD ST HS AS N I L AN D ANX
T
(104)
3.38
(2)
7.61
(2.9)
6.45
(2.6)
1.31
(0.95)
1.51
(1.3)
0.64
(1)
2.72
(1.3)
0.30
(0.6)
0.81
(0.9)
2.25
(1.3)
1.55
(1.2)
1.59
(1.3)
2.30
(1.4)
2.60
(1.4)
M
(29)
4.52
(1.8)
8.07
(3.1)
5.97
(2.5)
1.66
(0.9)
1.97
(1.3)
0.90
(0.9)
2.66
(1.5)
0.45
(0.6)
1.17
(1.1)
1.86
(1.3)
1.93
(1.3)
1.59
(1.1)
1.86
(1.5)
2.52
(1.3)
W
(75)
2.93
(1.9)
7.43
(2.8)
6.64
(2.6)
1.17
(0.9)
1.33
(1.3)
0.55
(1)
2.75
(1.2)
0.24
(0.5)
0.67
(0.8)
2.40
(1.3)
1.40
(1.1)
1.59
(1.4)
2.47
(1.3)
2.63
(1.4)
U-Mann–
Whitney
0.001 n.s. n.s. 0.01 0.02 0.008 n.s. 0.03 0.03 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.04 n.s.
SA-B-C, Salamanca Test; Type A-B-C scales, Subscales from the Salamanca: P, paranoid; SD, schizoid; ST, schizotype; HS, histrionic; AS, antisocial; N, narcissist; I,
impulsive; L, limit; AN, anankastic; D, dependent; ANX, anxious.
(0.4–0.8), d Cohen = 0.48]. On the other hand, women showed a
signiﬁcantly higher score in the dependent subscale of the Type
C [Mann–Whitney U = 816, p < 0.04; CI 95% mean for men
(1.2–2.4) vs. women (2.1–2.7), d Cohen = 0.42].
Discussion
In the light on the outcome of the present experiment, our
detectors were quite successful in determining the children’s
truths and lies, since the classiﬁcation was correct in 66.5%,
signiﬁcantly above from the standard 50–54% accuracy level
(Bond and DePaulo, 2006), without signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the detection of true or false videos, and with a
moderately good overall index of discriminability. Studies that
apply a paradigm in which the children choose to lie (or
not) about a transgression by telling “no” (or “yes”) to the
question: “did you peek?” show that adults are bad detectors,
with both deception and truth detection near chance (Leach et al.,
2004; Crossman and Lewis, 2006). Interestingly, some contextual
variations of the task, like pressing the children to consider the
moral implications of deceit or to promise to be honest before
the task can facilitate the subsequent deception detection above
chance (Leach et al., 2004). Our children were pressed to perform
the task well to satisfy their parents, but they told us far more than
a monosyllable: in our paradigm they must invent spontaneous
stories (see transcriptions, Supplementary Material). Then, one
could consider the speech’s content as a clue factor to perform
the detection task. However, as explained before, care was taken
in the selection of the videos to keep the children’s discourse
reasonable even when they told a lie, so we should assume
other factor out of the purely verbal contents of the discourse.
Methods of veracity detection that use the linguistic diﬀerences
in true and false stories (CBCA, reality monitoring) show rates
of correct classiﬁcation from 65 to 90% in trained detectors, but
these methods when applied to children are problematic because
children’s reports tend to contain fewer details and are generally
shorter (Brunet et al., 2013). Most of the spontaneous reports of
our children were in fact too short to apply CBCA.Another factor
to consider could be the age of the children: were them too young
to elaborate a good fake, so they were easily detected? We don’t
think so, because from the point of view of the development of
the ability of lying, a child of 7 years has reached enough level
of Theory of Mind to be able to perform successfully lying, with
intentionality and conventionality (Talwar and Lee, 2002; Lee,
2013).
Instead of the children’s age or the verbal content of their
discourse, our interest was their facial expression as analyzed
with an automated method: the FaceReader. The results were
quite interesting: some videos were more easily guessed than
others, whether the girl had told a truth or a lie (see Table 1).
A signiﬁcant inverse correlation between the accuracy in the
detection and the neutral expression of the children appeared.
Thus, the less expressive was the child the harder was the
detection. This was conﬁrmed when testing accuracy between
the emotional and neutral videos: the mean success rate for
the emotional videos was signiﬁcantly higher (see Table 2). In
addition, though non-signiﬁcant, there was a 39% diﬀerence in
guessing between the lies expressed with and without emotional
facial expression (the “poker face” was harder to read). This
makes the present methodology promising for future studies with
higher samples. Some authors have analyzed diﬀerences between
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facial expressiveness of liars and control children before. For
instance, in the study of Talwar et al. (2007) that variable was
coded manually (non-automated) according the Facial Action
Coding System (FACS, Ekman et al., 2002) and revealed small but
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between liars and control children in terms
of both positive and negative facial expressions (unfortunately
the authors did not tested its inﬂuence in the detectors). A more
similar decoding than ours, with a computer-based automatic
vision system, did recognize, with 85% accuracy, the facial
expressions of faked pain in adults, compared to the recognition
of trained human detectors, who obtained just 55% accuracy
(Bartlett et al., 2014). Note that this data prove the existence
of certain facial expression associated to deception that can be
identiﬁed through automatic tools. In the present experiment
the most emotionally expressive faces as automatically coded
were the most transparent to human detectors, which helped
for the detection of either false or true stories of the children.
Some authors have suggested that emotional expressiveness
in general is related to being judged as trustworthy (Boone
and Buck, 2003); instead, we found it to be related as being
more easily understood (including the hidden intentions to
deceit). Following authors who suggest that the lies can be
more accurately detected when less-conscious mental processes
are used (Reinhard et al., 2013; ten Brinke et al., 2014) it is
plausible that such unconscious process involving the perception
of emotion in the face could facilitate the detection of deceptive
or truthful information; this hypothesis remains to be evaluated.
In addition, we observed a bias toward lies in our detectors: a
positive C index indicating the labeling of the truth-tellers as
liars. This supports the data of Crossman and Lewis (2006) about
a suspicion in the detectors when evaluating children, judging
them more prone to lie, which diﬀers from research on detection
of adult’s lies, that tends to demonstrate a truth bias (Eldestein
et al., 2006).
An interesting ﬁnding of the present experiment was the
relation between personality variables and lie detection. Among
other personality traits studied, the attachment anxiety, described
as anxiety from separation and abandonment, has been related
to good lie detection as commented in the introduction.
The attachment anxiety is related to the activation of a
psychobiological innate system that motivates people to seek
proximity to signiﬁcant others if in need of protection from
threats, and is known to be related to superior abilities to quickly
and accurately detect of those threats and dangers (Mikulincer
and Shaver, 2007; Ein-Dor et al., 2010). This raises the possibility
for the existence of an innate ability to detect deceit, as a socially
oriented threat, in these patients. Ein-Dor and Perry (2014)
demonstrated that attachment anxiety (but not other types like
social, avoidance, or security anxiety; DePaulo and Tang, 1994)
predicted a more accurate detection of deceitful statements and
a greater amount of money won during a poker game. Here
we found that those subjects scoring higher in the dependent
personality scale were signiﬁcantly the most accurate in the task
of detection and intriguingly also in the detection without facial
emotional cues (the “hard” situation), as well as were less prone
to believe that the statement was true when the girl was telling
a lie. The deﬁnition (according DSM-IV-R) of the dependent
subject as “showing passivity so that others take responsibility
over the subject’s own decisions, along with subordination and
inability to fend alone due to lack of conﬁdence” is very close
to that of attachment anxiety and, in fact, most patients with a
dependent personality disorder have suﬀered from attachment
anxiety in their childhood (Silove et al., 2011). The present
results, along with data from Ein-Dor and Perry (2014), show
that the attachment anxiety and the dependent personality at a
subclinical level could oﬀer certain social adaptive advantages.
This supports the view of Nettle (2006) about variations in
personality, which are better described in terms of a mixture
of costs and beneﬁts for the individual such that the optimal
value for ﬁtness may depend on a concrete context. In fact,
literature shows that individuals with dependent personality
disorder are very eﬃcient at reading subtle social cues such as
facial expression, presumably due to their need to behave in a way
that maximizes probability of care (Bornstein, 2012); the present
data are in complete accordance with this view. None other scale
was related to lie detection, so we cannot support the view of
Green and Phillips (2004) about adaptive advantages of paranoia,
at least at a subclinical level and in relation with children’s lie
detection.
Additionally, despite our sample had a low number of men, we
were interested in testing gender diﬀerences. There is a general
assumption that women are superior to men in interpreting
other people’s non-verbal behavior (Hall, 1978). Women have
advantage over men in reading facial expressions (DePaulo
et al., 1993) though literature indicates that they have just an
advantage when the person whose lies are trying to detect is a
closer person, for instance a romantic partner (Vrij, 2011). No
statistical diﬀerences were found here, only a trend for women
to a better discrimination when judging a true statement and,
interestingly, in the more diﬃcult condition (neutral expression).
This ﬁnding resembles the data of Wojciechowski et al. (2014)
about the superiority of women in the performance of a deception
task with inconsistencies between the facial and verbal cues.
It would be of worth for future studies to perform more
experiments with larger samples to check if women can be better
lie detectors than men in a variety of harder circumstances
(for instance, in total absence of facial emotional cues). In
addition, we observed that men tended to be more suspicious
than women when judging the children’s veracity, and their
lie bias was higher, supporting the suggestion of DePaulo
et al. (1993) about women being more inclined to believe
that they are being told the truth than men. The reader must
note that these latter assumptions are based only in statistical
trends and are commented only to encourage other authors to
check for gender diﬀerences routinely. Additionally, personality
diﬀerences by gender showed men scoring signiﬁcantly higher
in paranoid, schizoid, schizotype, antisocial, and narcissist, and
women scoring signiﬁcantly higher in dependent, results that
are in accordance with published data (Golomb et al., 1995;
Bornstein, 1996).
In sum, we found that children telling deceptive or truthful
stories with an unemotional facial expression according the
FaceReader were harder to catch. Thus, the automated analysis
of facial expression can help as a tool for detecting deception in
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children. In addition, the emotional expressiveness could aﬀect
stronger in some people with especial personality traits who
possibly process the emotional info in a diﬀerent way, concretely
persons with subclinical dependent personality disorder; making
them best lie detectors. This study has a number of limitations
that could be overcome in future work. The number of videos
applied was low and should be increased at least until a valid
sample of videos of each of the basic emotions would be reached.
The sample of detectors should be increased and be gender-
matched. In addition, the detectors should be questioned about
their perception of emotion in the facial expression of the
children, how diﬃcult they found the task, if they used the
emotional or other clues to the task etc. At the moment from the
present data, implications for forensic psychology are suggested:
to explore whether the induction of an emotion in a child during
an interview could be useful to evaluate the testimony during
legal trials. In any case, these results and its implications are
relevant speciﬁcally for those legal situations in which an adult
pushes a child to tell a lie, but not necessary for those in which the
child spontaneously decides to tell a lie. In addition, it should be
noted that the children who go through a real legal process have
much more motivation and their emotional state is much more
complex, which could potentially aﬀect adults’ ability to detect
lies. In any case, further study of facial emotional expressiveness
of children is of interest to forensic psychology.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.01089
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